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THE JUDICIARY AND INSTITUTIONS
OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Mark Tushnet
When speaking of the transition from apartheid to democracy, one can
too easily become a cheerleader for an independent judiciary. When
contrasting an independent judiciary with what was known as "telephone
justice" in the former Soviet Union-where judges would call up the
local Communist Party chief to find out what they should do in particular cases-the argument for independence is obviously strong. Further,
the United States experience with an independent judiciary over the past
half-century is good enough to quell doubts that might have arisen in
earlier generations when an independent judiciary acted as a political
force independent of, and at odds with, majorities controlling other
political institutions. The exact boundaries of what constitutes an independent judiciary, and what it should do, remain ill-defined. Under these
circumstances, it is important to introduce some skeptical notes into the
chorus of enthusiasm about judicial review.
This comment is divided into three parts. First, I examine some reasons to think that there is little to be gained by talking about institutional details, largely because we know almost nothing about the long-term
significance of such details. Second, the argument is made that styles of
judicial decision-making may be more important in the early years of a
constitutional democracy than institutional details. Finally, the proposition that the early experience with judicial review in the United States
may have little bearing on questions of judicial review following the
transition to democracy in contemporary societies is examined.
I.

Skepticism About Institutional Details

Constitutional lawyers in the United States, having discovered that
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. Of course, there are problems in the contemporary United States constitutional
order, such as its apparent inability to deal with the federal budget. In an extended
sense, perhaps, these concerns may be laid at the door of the judiciary, which, it
might be argued, generated or lent support to a culture of rights that has made it
more difficult to resolve political controversies in the political arena.
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constitutionalists elsewhere think it important to compare their institutions to ours, have begun to write about comparative constitutional law.
Their articles tend to have two parts. The first and larger part enumerates different ways of organizing systems of judicial review. There is
general agreement that judges who exercise the power of judicial review
ought to serve relatively long terms. The question then becomes whether
the terms should endure indefinitely as in the United States, or whether
judges should serve a single defined term of perhaps fifteen-years or
perhaps a renewable eight-year term. A second concern arises because
these judges will exercise a power that combines both law and politics.
Therefore, should they be selected through a process heavily dominated
by politics, as in the United States? Alternatively, should they be chosen
through a process that highlights their technical legal abilities, perhaps
by limiting the pool of potential candidates to those who have avoided
substantial political involvements? Related to this last question is whether constitutional review should be centralized in a specialized constitutional court, on the theory that only specialized judges will be sensitive
to the political dimensions of constitutional law, or whether such review
should be distributed among the ordinary courts, with final review in a
generalized court in the American style, on the theory that specialized
judges will undervalue the legal dimensions of constitutional law.
The second and shorter part of comparative constitutional law articles
tend to assert that theory and experience demonstrate the value of organizing systems of judicial review similar to that of the United States. I
believe that rather little is gained in spending time considering these
institutional details. First, the transition from a non-democratic to a
democratic constitutional regime is likely to take a long time. What
seems significant at an early point may fade from the scene, and early
"successes" may look different as time passes. Second, although it is
relatively easy to show that an independent judiciary is likely to serve
constitutional democracy, details for such a system remain confused and
complicated. Only some institutional arrangements made at the outset
will have long-term effects, and we have almost no theoretical or empirical basis for choosing one over another institutional arrangement.
A.

EARLY DEVELOPMENTS ARE AMBIGUOUS

Recent comments by Eric Stein and Herman Schwartz suggest why
skepticism about early developments might be justified. Stein says in the
course of discussing constitutional federalism in Czechoslovakia,
"[h]appily, the Constitutional Court

. .

. has been in place since 1991,

and its first case dealing with a jurisdictional conflict is a harbinger of
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things to come."2 Whether the Constitutional Court solved its problem
"happily", it seems quite premature to pronounce on the Court's success
especially in light of the dissolution of the Federal Republic.
Schwartz discusses a more interesting, and more ambiguous, development in Russia Shortly after the coup attempt in August 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin began to dismantle the KGB, the state security agency. The authority left to the KGB differed little from that of
the general police force, controlled by the Interior Ministry (MVD).
Yeltsin, therefore, directed that the KGB be merged with the MVD,
purporting to exercise his general executive authority. He then appointed
Victor Barranikov, a close political ally, to head the merged agency.
Fearing that KGB agents would actually control the new force, and
thereby threaten individual rights and Russia's new democracy, fifty-one
deputies challenged the merger in the Constitutional Court, arguing that
the merger was beyond Yeltsin's power. The Constitutional Court
agreed, and ordered the merger dissolved. According to Schwartz,
Yeltsin had to be persuaded to comply, but eventually he did.' In the
end, however, he kept Barranikov as head of the old KGB and named
Barranikov's deputy to head the MVD.
As Schwartz points out, the significance of the Constitutional Court's
decision remains undetermined.' Consider the analogy to Marbury v.
Madison.' United States constitutionalists marvel at John Marshall's
cleverness, in establishing the power of judicial review and chastising
President Thomas Jefferson, while leaving Jefferson's immediate political
power unimpaired. The KGB-MVD merger may turn out to be Russia's

2. See Eric Stein, Devolution or Deconstruction Czecho-Slovak Style, 13 Mica
I INT'L L. 786, 801 (1992)(discussing the Constitutional Court's review, upon the
request of the Federal Ministry of Communications, of the interpretation of 1990

Czech and Slovak new allocation of powers law with reference to jurisdiction over
the communications network).

3. See Herman Schwartz, The New East European Constitutional Courts, 13
MICH. L INT'L L. 741 (1992) [hereinafter Schwartz] (cross-comparing characteristics of
different courts in Russia, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Romania
and noting comparisons with the United States).
4. See id at 767 (discussing the Constitutional Court's finding that the KGB
and MVD merger, as authorized by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, was unconstitutional).
5. See id at 767-68 (stating that the Constitutional Court's utilization of judicial
review to rebuke President Yeltsin's decree demonstrates the Court's dedication to the
rule of law).
6. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803) (proposing the federal judicial power to review the acts of Congress and state governments).
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Marbury. The Court exercised the power of judicial review, challenged
President Yeltsin more directly than Marshall challenged Jefferson, and
triumphed. Although Yeltsin apparently needed persuading, in the end he
realized he could promote his immediate political goals without confronting the Constitutional Court, by putting two allies in charge of the
de-merged agencies. The experience may turn out to validate judicial
review if, some time in the future, courts tell the Russian president or
legislature that they simply cannot do what they want to do.
However, the story may turn out differently. Perhaps the lesson will
be, not that judicial review is valuable, but that it is pointless. After all,
Russians a decade from now might conclude that Yeltsin ended up
getting essentially what he wanted. Judicial review, they may think, put
a facade of legality and constitutionalism on a purely political practice
that continued unaffected by the Constitutional Court's decision. We
simply do not know now which interpretation will turn out to be correct.
It seems worthwhile to propose an even broader skepticism, although
I do not share it. Perhaps, even an independent judiciary may not be an
important component of constitutional democracy. In the United States,
the independent judiciary has been part of our constitutional democracy
from the beginning. However, as Donald Horowitz has suggested, international experience shows that, at least in "severely divided societies,"
judicial review does not ensure constitutionalism." Horowitz noted that
larger societal discord may affect judicial decisions, undermining the
integrity of the judiciary.' Likewise, self-interested politicians may
achieve similar results by disobeying judicial decrees or limiting the
courts jurisdictional authority.9 As the KGB-MVD example shows, similar results can be achieved by working around the constitutional strictures. Judicial review seems compatible both with constitutional democracy as well as non-democratic regimes, as long as such review is not a
mere sham. When judicial review coexists with constitutional democracy,
the reason may lie in the society's deeper commitment to a democratic
culture rather than in the society's institutional arrangements.
As Horowitz suggests in his general thesis, however, choices made

7. See DONALD L. HOROWriz, A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA? CONSTITUTIONAL
ENGINEERING IN A DIVIDED SocIETY 159 (1991) [hereinafter Horowitz] (citing the
presence of external, extra-judicial pressures placed upon some divided nations' judiciaries and the influence these pressures may have on their decisions).
8. Id at 159.
9. Id
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about judicial review early in the life of a constitutional democracy may
set the society on particular paths."0 Small changes early on may have
large effects later. Horowitz argues persuasively that choosing the correct
electoral system at the outset substantially affects whether the constitutional regime will be able to stabilize itself for the long haul." I am
unable to come up with reasons to believe that the design details of
judicial review will have such effects: whether judges serve for life
terms or for fifteen years; or whether the constitutional court is specialized or generalist, do not appear to have predictable long-term consequences.
B.

THE ARGUABLE IRRELEVANCE OF DESIGN DETAiLs

We might choose among institutional designs on either the basis of a
theory of judicial behavior, or on the basis of judicial experience. Unfortunately, I know of no decent theory of judicial behavior that sheds
light on the design questions, and experience is so scant that it likewise
provides no ground for choice.
Like all questions of institutional design, the ones in this area require
answers that simultaneously provide actors-in this case the judges
exercising the power of judicial review-with appropriate incentives, and
embed appropriate expertise in the relevant institutions. Two premises
underlie suggested answers to the basic design questions. First, some
insulation from political influence is essential if constitutional review is
to succeed. The insulation must be sufficient to immunize judges from
political demands, from having incentives to cater to the desires of a
powerful group (whether it be politicians holding power in other institutions, or other interest or ethnic groups who the judges might take as
their constituencies). Second, constitutional review blends political and
legal considerations. Interestingly, these two premises point in different
directions. The requirement of insulation, or independence, could be satisfied if judges regarded themselves as purely legal specialists. While
taking advantage of one expertise, in law, complete insulation from
politics would deny the judges another expertise, in politics. That, in
turn, would reduce the effectiveness of the blend of law and politics that
is constitutional review.
As a result, theory says little about institutional design. Theoretical

10. Id. at 163.
11. See idL at 163 (suggesting that the electoral system is the most powerful tool
in ethnically and racially divided countries to influence constitutional development).
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frameworks rather strongly suggest that long terms should be preferred
to short ones, because judges with short terms will have too many incentives to cater to prevailing political or interest group demands, so as
to create opportunities for post-judging careers. However, no guide as to
the length of these terms has been suggested.
The next consideration is the choice between a specialized and centralized constitutional court or a court where constitutional review is
only part of the business. That choice cannot be divorced from the
choice among selection methods, which depends on essentially empirical
evaluations. Opinions will differ, and theory provides no guidance, about
the right balance between law and politics in constitutional review.
Those who prefer the balance to favor the political aspect, rather than
the legal side, may prefer a centralized and specialized court. Those who
prefer the balance to weigh more heavily on the legal side might accept
such a court, but only if the selection methods would systematically
favor legal technicians over politically-astute judges. In any event, much
will turn on the traditions and training of the judges themselves. The
United States system of constitutional review may have succeeded not
because of any particular institutional design, but because lawyers and
judges in the United States have always been sensitive to the political
dimensions of legal decisions.
Theoretical considerations thus can be brought forward to support
essentially any of the prominent models of institutional design. The
choice cannot be substantially affected by examining what forms of
constitutional review have worked, as the record is quite thin. Successes
are few, and the courts that have succeeded appear to share no characteristics sufficient to suggest that institutional design matters. Failures,
too, are few, largely because constitutional review is not a widely accepted practice. As is evident in the successful courts, the failures seem
to come in all institutional varieties.
The example set by the United States is itself more ambiguous than
has often been supposed. The successes of judicial review are concentrated in the recent past, from roughly 1940 to the present. Prior to this
time, contemporaneous judgment argued that the case for judicial review
was quite uncertain. Of course, no institutional arrangements have
changed between the period of failure and that of success.
In the generation before the Civil War, the United States lurched from
crisis to crisis. The judiciary, as independent then as it is now, never
helped resolve these crises. Moreover, with its decision in Dred Scott v.
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Sanfor4'2 the judiciary actually exacerbated the climactic crisis. Even
today, the independent judiciary may have contributed to the near paralysis of United States political institutions by magnifying the sense of
alienation experienced by people who feel they lack control over their
political order. By exercising the power of judicial review, the independent judiciary removes issues from the people's hands, and they come to
think that political participation is not worth their time because important decisions will be resolved by judges and in a manner which they
cannot control.
Lacking either theoretical or evidentiary grounds for insisting on a
particular institutional arrangement, political decision-makers, constructing new constitutions for transition into constitutional democracies, will
almost certainly respond to the politics of the moment in giving judicial
review its particular form. Whatever form it eventually takes, no one is
likely to know for a long time whether such a framework will succeed
or fail.
This would be a matter of concern if the politically driven choice had
definable long-term effects. That certainly seems true of other early
design choices. Horowitz argues, for example, that South Africa would
be ill-served by an early decision to adopt the Anglo-American "firstpast-the-post" system for deciding who wins elections, and that some
forms of proportional representation are more likely than others to promote long-term stability. 3 He also notes, and is troubled by the fact
that immediate political concerns, in the foreseeable South African context, point toward adopting a system that is less likely to promote stability. However, as I have indicated, the situation is different with respect
to the institutions of constitutional review.

II. Methods of Reasoning and Judicial Review After the
Transition
One might contrast an independent judiciary, not with telephone justice, but with a judiciary in a well-established, well-functioning democratic system. There, the case for a judiciary that is both independent, in
a formal sense, and dependent, in the sense that judges do not have

12. See Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (holding that
descendents of the African race are not considered citizens within the meaning of the
Constitution).
13. See HoRowIZ, supra note 8, at 163-67 (discussing the tendency of plurality
electoral systems to underrepresent minorities and obtain legislative control by united

pluralities).
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values too substantially at variance from those prevalent in the representative branches, is rather strong. As a further practical matter, in such a
system the democratic majority is unlikely to tolerate long any institution that remains substantially out of line with majority desires, meaning
that the judiciary remains independent in the only way that matters.
In the situation we are addressing, whether and how to establish the
institutions of an independent judiciary in the years immediately following the creation of a democratic system, the argument about judicial
independence is more complicated. We should begin by sketching the
point of having first a constitution and then establishing judicial review.
Constitutions are often best understood as pre-commitments by people to
refrain from self-interested actions. In effect, the constitution's framers
are stating things they believe they and their successors might want to
do, which would be detrimental if done. Therefore, they promise not to
do them, and direct their successors not to do them either. Constitutions
are designed, in this view, to promote overall social welfare by barring
people from taking actions that, in the immediate circumstances, seem
beneficial, but which, in the long run, actually will undermine social
welfare. The constitution is, roughly speaking, a contract whose terms
seem acceptable at the time. As time goes on, however, political circumstances may change; the deal struck earlier might seem less acceptable to politicians, who will adopt laws reflecting their immediate circumstances.
In the short run, those who make such commitments can be expected
to honor most of them, because (in the short run) their immediate political concerns are unlikely to be inconsistent with the commitments they
are willing to make at the time. Roughly speaking, one side is saying to
the other not to fear actions taken by the party in power because the
reasons for putting the new government in place take precedence over
minor political conflict. As a sign of good faith, the party in power will
support a constitutional provision barring them from taking the feared
actions.
For the first few years after the constitution is adopted, political circumstances are likely to be reasonably stable; what made sense when
the constitution was adopted is likely to continue to make sense. Ordinarily, even politicians act in good faith, and those who signed the
initial deal will find persuasive the argument that they agreed to certain
limitations. Even when the reason for inserting a constitutional limitation
was that the interest in putting a new government in place overrode any
desire to harm the political losers, a desire to ensure some degree of
short-run stability may continue to constrain the new government.
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In the long run, though, pre-commitments and political interests can
be expected to diverge. Politicians will respond, credibly, that they never
agreed to limit themselves in this particular way on this particular issue.
Conversely, they may say that they no longer believe that acting in
violation of the limitation would be as bad as their predecessors believed. Even farther down the line, they may assert that any deals struck
by a prior generation of politicians have no binding force on a new
generation.
There is a second difficulty: sometimes, drafters of a constitution
consciously defer, or blur over, controversial decisions on which they
cannot come to a solution acceptable to all parties."' Ordinarily, the
very politicians who found it important to defer controversy at the constitution-writing stage will find it equally important to continue to defer
controversy at later stages. However, sometimes political factors will
lead politicians to inject one of these controversial, deferred issues into
ordinary politics immediately after the constitution is adopted. Again, the
experience in the Czech and Slovak Federated Republic is instructive.
The immediate post-transition constitution deferred resolution of fundamental questions of federalism, and politicians in Slovakia never suspended their efforts to re-structure the new regime's federal system, to
the point where the federation dissolved."S
When controversial, deferred issues are again injected into ordinary
politics, or when political interests and acknowledged pre-commitments
diverge substantially, some mechanism to enforce the pre-commitments
embodied in the constitution is necessary. Structural arrangements like
federalism and separation of powers can sometimes be enough to ensure
that pre-commitments will be honored, particularly where those precommitments ought to lead the government to refrain from acting.'
14. For example, the framers of the United States Constitution did not definitively resolve how governmental power would in the long run be allocated between
the states and the nation. Nearly all of the framers would likely have thought it improper for the national government to exercise power in the field of education. Yet,
they gave the national government power to act in the national defense, and by the
1950s the link between education and national defense became almost indisputable.
Because the Constitution's allocation of power does not preclude the exercise of power over education in the name of national defense, politicians were able to say, credibly, that Congress ought to exercise such power.
15. Stein, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
16. Further, because these structures operate most effectively to keep the government from acting, they leave the array of non-public power in place. Domestic corporations, multinational corporations, and international institutions like the International
Monetary Fund therefore have greater effective power in the society than they would
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The enforcement mechanism is political bargaining. Interestingly, constitutional experience in the United States and elsewhere strongly suggests
that structural arrangements must be supplemented by some other enforcement method.
For United States constitutionalists, enforcement by means of an independent judiciary exercising the power of judicial review is the primary
additional method of enforcement." This means, though, that judges are
in a position to obstruct what political majorities want. When the institutions of democracy have only recently been established, demonstrating to
the citizenry that their participation in politics makes a difference seems
particularly important. Judicial review ought therefore to be quite unusual, and the pre-commitments the courts enforce ought to be quite important.
The details of judicial organization, while interesting and significant
on the margins, are less important than more fundamental issues going
to the "legal-constitutional culture." The reason for this secondary importance arises from the task given to judges. Judges are to enforce the
pre-commitments contained in the constitution. But, discerning exactly
what those commitments are, by interpreting the constitution, is not a
simple technical exercise. Constitutional interpretation will be affected by
the judges' legal-constitutional culture. If the judges enforcing the constitution have an appropriate set of cultural values, any organization of
judicial review will work well enough, and if the judges lack those
values, no organization will work.
Cultural values can be divided into two groups: those of the legal
culture itself, that is, how judges and lawyers approach questions of
constitutional law, and those of the general public. With respect to the
lawyers' culture, there are again two approaches which affect how the
judges go about identifying the constitutional pre-commitments they are
to enforce. The first approach, termed the formalist approach for purposes of this article, argues that judges can and should treat the constitution
as ordinary, although supreme, law. In dealing with constitutional issues,
formalists will confine their attention to aspects of the law such as the
language they are asked to interpret and its legal background-how
similar words have been interpreted in other contexts. They give relatively little weight to the purposes that the constitutional provision at
issue was designed to serve. Formalists see the constitution as a techni-

if the government were completely unconstrained by pre-commitments.
17. See, e.g., TiE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the tenure of judges based upon good behavior to safeguard independence).
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cal legal document and they will bring a technician's cast of mind to its
interpretation.
The justification for formalism is that judges who pay attention to
purposes may be overly influenced by the same immediate short-term
pressures that gave rise to the constitutional dispute, and thereby may
fail to enforce the pre-commitments within the constitution. This is
particularly true if the composition of the judiciary mirrors (in political
terms) the composition of the political branches. Then, judges who examine constitutional purposes will too often conclude that their counterparts in politics were merely trying to pursue the constitution's purposes, and that the constitutional pre-commitments were therefore not
breached.
The second approach is instrumentalist. In this approach, purposes
play a large role, although not the only one. Finding the traditional
sources of legal interpretation inadequate, either with respect to the law
as a whole, or with respect to the constitution understood as a special
kind of law, instrumentalists ask how particular controversies could be
resolved so as to promote the purposes for which the constitution was
adopted. This examination of purposes includes whether the enforcement
of pre-commitments under the circumstances following the adoption of
the constitution would entail immediate losses in social welfare.
Consider, for example, the question of whether the United States
government can aid selected aspects of elementary and secondary education. Congress may attempt to direct local education investment into
science and technical education because it believes that doing so will
promote the nation's defense. If that effort is challenged as exceeding
Congress's authority, an instrumentalist judge will ask whether this
program actually assists in promoting national defense. The answer to
that question will take almost exactly the same form as the debates in
Congress. The formalist judge, on the other hand, will ask whether the
proposed program truly falls within the constitutional provisions giving
Congress power to promote the national defense. The answer will take
the form of recognizing Congress' good faith, or treating the invocation
of the national defense power as a pretext for claiming power that Congress does not have. 8

18. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), overruled by United States

v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (limiting congressional authority to regulate interstate
commerce produced by child laborers); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20
(1922) (invalidating Congress' Child Labor Tax Law which required employers to pay
taxes for child laborers).
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The other aspect of the legal-constitutional culture is the culture of
legalism in the general public. In this aspect, the question is whether the
public will see judicial interpretations of the constitution as entitled to
respect because the judges are specialists in interpreting the law (and
because the constitution is law), or whether the people will regard judicial review as simply another stage in on-going political controversies.
With these distinctions in hand, I suggest that creating a constitutional
culture in the modem world may be quite difficult, although not impossible. On the one hand, it seems essential that in the early years of a
constitutional regime, judges should be formalists. If controversial deferred issues are placed on the political agenda soon after the
constitution's adoption, judges will be asked to resolve important constitutional controversies, and the contending parties will each argue that
the constitution's purposes will best be served by following their particular path. If the judges pay too much attention to purposes, the public is
likely to see them as taking partisan sides, and the constitution's effectiveness as a pre-commitment will be reduced. Ethan Klingsberg, discussing Hungary, suggests that legal realism will quickly appear because
the political branches are more likely to engage in criticism of the constitutional court's work. Such critiques will surely lead to legal realist
allegations that ulterior motives influence decisions. 9
The United States experience is suggestive. John Marshall's Supreme
Court first exercised the power of judicial review in a case that combined a fundamental issue of constitutional power-the extent to which
the first substantial shift in political power would be honored-with an
extremely technical issue regarding judicial organization."0 In Marbury
v. Madison, Marshall used a highly formalist approach to the second
issue, thereby establishing the Court's power of judicial review."' Marshall and his colleagues actually took a formalist approach to the first
issue as well. The answers Marshall gave, in dictum, enraged his political opponents. Had he asked the instrumentalist question of why the
Constitution gives Congress the power to create lower federal courts, the
partisan nature of his answer would have been even more apparent.
Yet, in the modern world, and in circumstances of high political

19. Ethan Klingsberg, Judicial Review and Hungary's Transition from Communism
to Democracy: The Constitutional Court, the Continuity of Law, and the Redefinition
of Property Rights, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 41, 125 (discussing Hungary's transition
from a "command-obedience" judicial system to one of consent).
20. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
21. Id.
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concern, it may be difficult for judges to adhere to the formalist approach. Sophisticated judges will know that formalism is not highly
regarded among elite legal thinkers, and to the extent that they take
such thinkers as one of their audiences they may be disinclined to adopt
formalist approaches.'
Although one might take this as an argument for selecting relatively
unsophisticated constitutional judges, another concern intervenes. If constitutional controversies arise that go to the foundations of the constitutional order, judges-especially relatively unsophisticated judges-are
likely to have strong views about how those controversies should be
resolved, that are independent of their detached reflection on the formal
meaning of the constitution's provisions. After all, they inevitably have
backgrounds that influence their thinking about the world as a whole, as
well as the meaning of their constitution. The more unsophisticated
judges are, the less likely they are to control their political inclinations.
The most formalist unsophisticated judge is likely to believe that the
only sensible reading of the plain language of the constitution supports
his or her own political inclinations. Moreover, no matter how formalist
a judge is, his or her actions are likely to be received by the public (in
the early years of a constitutional regime) as reflections of the judge's
substantive views.
This latter problem is likely to be exacerbated by the fact that the
country is in a transition from one regime to another. If the judges are
people clearly linked to the predecessor regime, which the new constitution repudiates, it seems likely that it will be quite difficult to establish distance in the public culture of legality between their substantive
views, which are connected in the eye of the public to their positions in
the predecessor regime, and the constitution itself as properly understood.
Taking the preceding points under consideration, the most optimistic
scenario for the successful establishment of an independent judiciary as
a means of enforcing constitutional commitments would have the following elements: (1) All, or a substantial number of the judges, should
not have held legal or political positions in the repudiated predecessor
regime. If, however, supporters of the predecessor regime still have
significant political power, some or a substantial number of the judges
must have held such positions in that regime; (2) For a period of time
(requiring a decade or more if based on reflection on the United States

22. For example, the foreign judges who are most admired in the United States
by legal academies are instrumentalists, not formalists.
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experience), the judges interpreting the constitution must adhere to a
relatively formalist approach to interpretation, thereby entrenching the
view that the constitution is law and not politics; (3) For an additional
decade or so, fundamental issues going to the core of the constitutional
order must not come before the courts. Otherwise, the sense that the
constitution is law rather than politics is unlikely to become entrenched
no matter how formalist the judges are.
Satisfying the first two conditions is likely to be extremely difficult.
Both "new" judges and supporters of the predecessor regime will be
suspicious of the courts, as will many "old" judges and supporters of
the successor regime. Furthermore, satisfying the third condition depends
on the accidents determining which constitutional issues come to the
courts early: are they primarily technical, or are they fundamental? Yet,
to call these "accidents" may be too generous. The issues that come to
the courts do so because politicians have adopted laws that raise constitutional issues. Satisfying the third condition, then, actually depends on
the constitutional astuteness of politicians: can they understand the importance of continuing to defer controversial issues until the constitutional order is fully entrenched?
III.

Special Dimensions of the United States Experience

United States constitutionalists, relying primarily on the experience of
recent decades, typically overlook the ways in which the transition to
judicial review in the United States was different from contemporary
problems. To begin, judicial review was not fully established when the
new government came into being. First, the new government created in
1789 rested on two decades of experience. From the mid-1760s through
the war for independence, the revolutionaries had established governments parallel to the official government. The Committees of Correspondence, state governments, and coordinated military actions during the
war for independence, were all transitional governments. The revolutionaries, in short, had been governing for a long time before the Constitution was adopted. Although they certainly expected the courts to enforce
the 1789 Constitution's limits, they basically added judicial review on to
a system of a reasonably well-functioning government.
Second, the transition occurred over an extremely extended period.
The "starting point" for the transition can reasonably be set at sometime
in the 1760s, after the shock of the French and Indian Wars. Even if
the starting point is determined to be later-in 1776, with the Declaration of Independence, or 1783, with the creation of the Confederation,
or even 1789, with the adoption of the Constitution-the transition's
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"ending point" should be set in 1800, when the first regime-shift occurred. Only in 1800 were those who took power immediately after the
Revolution displaced by another group of revolutionaries whom they
deeply believed to be fundamentally misguided. When the Federalists
relinquished power peacefully, this transfer of power signified that the
new government was stabilized. Further, not until 1803 did the Supreme
Court exercise the power of judicial review." During this extended
transition period, constitutional issues going to fundamental matters did
not come before the Supreme Court.
A third consideration is that the transition from the pre- to the postrevolutionary regime was, with respect to the relevant issues here, quite
sharp. Relatively few supporters of the predecessor regime remained in
the country, and essentially all the judges who took over had been central actors in the revolutionary transformation. The new government had
relatively little need to accommodate the interests of supporters of its
predecessor, except in the sense that the repudiation of state debts owed
to Loyalists constituted a continuing irritant in relations with Great Britain. Another favorable factor was that John Marshall and his colleagues
succeeded in transplanting the formalist legal culture pervasive in nonconstitutional law to the constitutional domain.'
Finally, relying too heavily on the United States experience risks
raising the difficulty that confronts all comparative exercises. People in
different systems use the same word to refer to institutions that fit into
their systems in quite different ways. For example, the word "federalism" means one thing in United States constitutional discussions and
quite another in South African ones. In the present context, it may be
misleading to refer to "judges" and "courts" in the United States and
South Africa as if they were the same institutions. Without careful attention to such matters as how judges are trained and chosen for the
bench, or what are the legal culture's values, United States
constitutionalists, understandably fond of their own system, may issue
misleading prescriptions for South Africa.
I am not confident that any of the world's current and impending
successor regimes will be so fortunate in having as favorable a conflu-

23. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137 (declaring the power of
the Supreme Court to determine the constitutionality of acts of Congress).
24. See GEORGE L. HASKINS & HERBERT A. JOHNSON, 2 HISTORY OF THE SUPREmE COURT OF THE UNITED STATES-FOUNDATIONS OF POWER, JOHN MARSHALL
1801-15 (1981) (describing how Marshall and his colleagues established the authority
of the Supreme Court despite earlier obscurity and the possibility of dissolution).
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ence of factors as the United States enjoyed. In particular, the possibility
of creating or sustaining a formalist approach to issues of high political
moment seems quite small. Perhaps, however, the conditions for the
successful establishment of a constitutional regime are not as stringent
as suggested.
IV.

Conclusion

Most discussions of judicial review in new constitutional regimes
assume that judicial review must be in place from the outset. An alternative model, however, is suggested by the Canadian framework. After
experience with a constitution specifying fundamental rights but lacking
judicial review, Canada adopted a Charter with judicially enforceable
rights. Perhaps it is best to begin with a constitution that is understood
to be hortatory. The constitutional exhortations themselves may restrain
politicians from blatantly violating their terms, without barring majorities
from adopting policies that can reasonably be defended as consistent
with the constitution. Then, as experience accumulates, the exhortations
can be transformed into enforceable rights. The vision would be of a
constitution that becomes entrenched, rather than of one that is entrenched from the start. After all, constitutional entrenchment is, as the
foregoing discussion of the legal and constitutional culture suggests,
always a process, and it may be best to acknowledge that from the
outset.

